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1. For setting up new VP-Schools and VP-Bereitschaften in September and October 1949, members of the Bereitschaften already organized in the various Laender were utilized as cadre personnel and unit instructors. In most cases the status of training and political orientation of the personnel so chosen were such that they could hardly be looked upon as proper instructors for younger men. Naturally there were great differences between individuals. These partly or badly trained men were then assigned to the new schools and Bereitschaften as instructors and unit commanders, receiving after a short time (sometimes at once) new recruits to be trained. All this did not work out well during this early period, as the training could not be carried out at once in a precise manner.
2. It would have been better if, when the new schools and Bereitschaften were first set up and received their full complement of instructors and cadre personnel, they had waited at least four weeks in order to train and prepare for their future mission before accepting new recruits. It would have been most advantageous to have had an overall training program for the officers and NCOs of these units in order to guarantee uniform instruction of recruits. As it happened, the early stages of instruction required a great deal of improvisation as a number of new recruits were assigned before the units had received their full quota of instructors. This made the proper carrying out of initial training most difficult.

Conclusion: In judging the level of training reached by the old Bereitschaften, they supposed it to have been much higher than it actually was. The assigning of new recruits four weeks later would have enabled the instructors to have been properly prepared to carry out their mission. Plans were made apparently without any thought for the future.

3. The VP-Schools are to train new officers while the VP-Bereitschaften are to train new NCOs. This called for first judging the leadership qualities of the new recruits before determining which should be sent to the schools and which to the Bereitschaften.

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As the courses of the schools are aimed at a higher level, assignment of less qualified recruits results in both loss of time and waste of training capacity as they cannot reach the goals required of them. On the other hand, there are recruits in the Bereitschaften whose capabilities are such that they could grasp the material presented in the schools.

4. The training plans for the first two months contained material and subjects for trainees who should have had the benefit of six months training. The instruction level was that of officers' schools which begin with trainees whose basic training has been thorough and complete.

No room was provided for any basic training of the individual. The tactical courses began at once with material which can only be introduced as unit training.

For example: The attack out of an assembly area. This is actually a tactical problem within the compass of unit training of an unattached platoon or of a company.

Where those in charge had enough tactical background, such subjects were completely reorganized and the necessary basic and individual training added to the curriculum. At other schools, tactical exercises were begun at once, for which the necessary background was lacking for a number of the trainees. The result of the latter course was an unprofitable use of time resulting in no practical advantage in training.

These two methods of initiating the instruction were followed through in every other tactical subject. The existence of such technical subjects in the beginning months of the training plan was as follows:

Armored, Artillery and Engineer training was mostly taught in theory, and then only incorrectly and incompletely handled. Often the necessary technical personnel were lacking and there were no instructions or manuals available. In these subjects even more time should be spent on basic training and tactical training of the individual soldier. Only in the third training month was this state of affairs recognized and the plans reorganized. They had to practically start over again from scratch.

5. The lack of all training aids such as manuals, training directives and instruction outlines, among other things, for the initiation of training, was noticeably disadvantageous. Not every officer and instructor was able to draw on his earlier technical knowledge and background. As time passed, instructions were issued to the schools and Bereitschaften as training aids. These instructions gave only a rough outline of the training desired and had to be worked out in detail before being of any value. Each instructor in doing this work had different views and opinions, making a uniform program for the trainees impossible. All these conditions explain why the goals set for the first 3 or 4 months of the training program could not be attained. There were too many difficulties and aspects of the initial phase to be overcome.
6. In what light does the training program appear today? It can be said that in general there has been a great deal of improvement. What has been the basis for this improvement?

- (a) In the leadership of the Administration and in the Main Administration for training itself.

Their personnel has been supplemented and strengthened by recruiting a number of competent VJ officers and men from the schools and Bereitschaften. The structure of the Main Administration has been expanded and better staffed so that more systematic and better work can be accomplished.

It has thus been possible to issue a number of basic instructions, service directives and orders in the last 4 to 6 weeks.

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To be sure, these new instructions had also to be partly re-worked, since the initial stages had produced many needs and showed up many deficiencies. However, the experience which has been gained to date has been evaluated and incorporated into these new orders.

The progress which has been achieved in methods of planning and the accomplishments resulting therefrom are in great measure due to the capability of the Chief of Staff who understands clearly and fully the means of achieving a goal systematically.

Meanwhile, a great number of useful manuals have been prepared in the Training Division for purposes of instruction; these have been divided into various branches of training and form a useful basis for instruction.

- (b) In the schools and Bereitschaften. There has been a fairly complete weeding out of attached personnel, in which the good and useful elements have come to the fore and have been joined in part by elements of the trainees who have taken over the junior positions. At the same time many who have proved themselves of no value have either been transferred or mustered out.

Through large-scale construction projects, they have been able to provide better installations from the point of view of space. The overcrowding of almost every Objekt at the beginning has been almost entirely eliminated by the construction program.

- (c) With progressive training and consolidation of discipline by means of extremely intensive political schooling which has recently been introduced, it can be expected that the morale value, the further addition of technical knowledge, and the political consciousness of all VP members will be raised as time passes.

The bettering of material provisions for successful training and instruction has been achieved recently throughout the organization, so that it is now merely a question of suitable planning and intensive work to come closer to the goal which they have set themselves.

7. What great deficiencies can still be pointed out? What things have made a change necessary in order that they can work even more successfully?

- (a) In the Hauptverwaltung für Ausbildung in Berlin:

a. In Training:

As a fundamental provision for the accomplishing of a real basis for every phase of the training program, there is a lack in quantity and in quality of training manuals for all branches of instruction. The manuals which have been issued up to the present time can only be described as makeshift and in time must be supplemented or replaced.

For the provision of such manuals a "Vorschriftenstelle" should be set up as another section or "Referat." In such a section several technically trained VP officers should be assigned, separated among the various branches, e.g., for Infantry, for Artillery, for Armor, etc. These officers would combine present existing material together with evaluations of experience up to the present time into new manuals. They should of course work in close cooperation with the Inspection and Training Sections.

b. In Organization:

The strong concentration of the entire work within the scope of all schools, Bereitschaften, and other headquarters within the Main Administration, creates a general overloading of the small number of personnel assigned, which re-

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matters. Those assigned to the Hauptverwaltung must occupy themselves with all too many small details of daily administration, and therefore do not have time for more important matters which require concentration and correct working conditions. It makes working on off-duty time and at night obligatory; this can be done in initial phases but is impossible in the long run.

They must stop this condition of continuing improvisation and gradually take up far-sighted methods of work. They would thereby, right from the start, avoid many mistakes, which in turn would lead to the strengthening of confidence in the overall leadership.

- c. It is necessary that all sections be better coordinated in regard to work methods. There should be no cases of contradictory orders being issued or similar actions which cause lower echelons to consider that those in Berlin do not know what the score is. The new regulation concerning administration affecting all Main Administrations will cause wide-spread changes in this condition.

(b) In the Schools and Bereitschaften:

a. In Training:

There is too much paper work, which does not allow the superior officers enough time to concern themselves with practical aspects of the service. The reason for this can be found in the system of mutual mistrust, which requires that every hour be accounted for, which account must then be checked.

They should give the superior officers concrete missions to accomplish within certain time intervals, at the end of which the result of his work should be tested by a check and inspection of practical performance or execution of the assigned mission.

This would raise the self-respect and feeling of responsibility of the junior VP officers, would give a better chance to judge them by their actual ability, and would save paper. As it is now, the officers have only forms to fill out and must produce endless plans. Correct control can only be found in the practical performance of any given task.

In brief, it can be shown thus: The time available for training is divided into five periods (e.g., during one year):

- 1st Period - Training of the individual soldier
- 2nd " - Training of the section
- 3rd " - Training of the platoon
- 4th " - Training of the company
- 5th " - Training in combined arms in fairly large scale exercises.

For every training period, a certain time is decided upon and a final goal assigned. A training plan sets the subjects, using estimates of the time necessary for them, but these must be kept flexible and at the discretion of the commanders of the Schools or Bereitschaften.

(For some subjects more time is necessary than has been planned for, while for others less time, depending on the capability of the trainees for absorbing the material).

The carrying out of all planning in detail as regards break-down of subjects and setting-up of classes is then the responsibility of the School or Bereitschaft.

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In making out reports it would not be necessary to account for each hour and each man, rather only a survey of actual accomplishment. The actual results must be determined by an inspection of practical execution of each branch of instruction.

These inspections must be carried out by capable superior VP officers from the Hauptverwaltung and other higher headquarters, officers who can exercise good judgment.

- b. The arming of personnel with small arms is not sufficient. Every man must have his own piece. The constant necessity of transferring weapons for training purposes causes additional work for the organization, and has an adverse effect on the individual soldier as well as making maintenance of such weapons difficult.

One can only demand good and capable work when one supplies the necessary means for its accomplishment.

- c. In many Schools and Bereitschaften there is not enough terrain made available for carrying out adequate tactical training. The provision of such terrain is difficult, especially in such Laender as Saxony and Thuringia where all farm land must be used for agricultural purposes. Objekts such as those at Zittow, Frankenberg, Löbau, Langensalza and Leipzig are examples.

In order to bring the training of these schools and Bereitschaften up to date as regards terrain exercises, it will soon be necessary to take over former maneuver areas.

The technical and political training status of the superior officers of the schools and Bereitschaften still varies to a large degree. The reason for this lies in their varied background. One has had experience as a former general, another as a regimental commander, others as company commanders, sergeants, corporals, or even only as privates. Some have been assigned on the strength of their political background, so that their technical background is weak, while the opposite is true of others.

A certain amount of time spent on regular training and schooling of the commanding officers would be beneficial, and this in turn would be very much to the advantage of the schools and Bereitschaften.

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Comment: Strictures aimed at the leadership of the Hauptverwaltung für Ausbildung and its policy decisions had to be softened, inasmuch as they also reflect on the judgment exercised by the Soviet control element.

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